THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE

"TO CARE FOR HIM WHO HAS BORNE THE BATTLE, AND FOR HIS WIDOW AND ORPHANS."

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A PERILOUS ENTERPRISE.

ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY CONSECUTIVE HOURS IN THE SADDLE.

THE CARTER RAID.

An Expedition into East Tennessee and the Destruction of the Virginia Railroad.

By G. C. KNIFFIN.

Among the patriots of 1861 there are none who have a stronger hold upon the veneration of the American people than those of East Tennessee. The courage and constancy of their devotion to the Union, their sufferings and exposure to death in every form that the malignity of their enemies could invent, their separation from their families during months of anxious waiting, when every messenger from their native land brought to their ears tales of outrage and cruel persecution inflicted upon those who were left behind, by a lawless horde of guerrillas who, in the name of the confederacy, filled the land with rapine and murder, their long probation and final triumph, forms matter for an epic poem for which the poet has not yet arisen. Banished from their homes by the stern edict of a power whose authority they defied, and which was at war with all their traditions of loyalty, they had no recourse from entering the confederate service except in expatriating themselves from their homes, and leaving their families to the tender mercies of freebooters. The occupation of East Tennessee by a military force sufficient to hold possession of it, had from the first outbreak of the rebellion been an object dear to the great heart of President Lincoln. Failure to accomplish this cherished result had caused the removal of General Buell from the command of the Army of the Ohio, to which General Rosecrans was assigned in October, 1862. The determination to carry out this object was impressed upon General Rosecrans, who found, on assuming command, the confederate army, under General Bragg, encamped in Middle Tennessee, thirty miles from Nashville. To move into East Tennessee through Cumberland Gap, even if so long a march over country roads, without adequate transportation for army supplies, in the early winter months had been practicable, would invite the capture of Nashville and the invasion of Kentucky from the South, resulting in cutting off his lines of communication with his base at Cincinnati and the possible occupation of the States north of the Ohio by the confederates. Yet preposterous as it appears, at this distance, the march through Cumberland Gap was persistently urged by the War Department. While Rosecrans was gathering his forces for a decisive blow upon the army in his front, the confederate cavalry, outnumbering that in the Union army three to one, were constantly raiding through the country in his rear. Forrest in West Tennessee turned his attention to the Mobile and Ohio Railroad in rear of General Grant, and Morgan in Kentucky fell upon the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and swept it clear of bridges and trestle work from Bacon Creek to the Rolling Fork.

While Morgan with his rough riders was illuminating the heavens along the line of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad with the light of burning bridges, a counter raid was in progress in East Tennessee, conducted by Brigadier-General S. P. Carter. On November 25th an expedition was proposed to enter East Tennessee and destroy the bridges along the line of the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. A good deal of time was used in organizing the expedition, and it was not until December 19th that arrangements were perfected and the movements ordered. Even then an insufficient force was detached upon a most hazardous expedition. Brigadier-General S. P. Carter, a native East Tennessean, in command of the forces assigned to the work, ordered a junction to be made in Clay county, Kentucky, and proceeded to that point on the 20th.

The organizations composing this force were as follows: Two batteries, Second Michigan cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell; Ninth Pennsylvania cavalry, Maj. Russell; First battery, Seventh Ohio cavalry, Maj. Rainy,—the brigade, 980 strong, being under command of Col. Chas. J. Walker of the Tenth Kentucky cavalry. A forage train accompanied the command sixty miles, and then, after distributing a portion of the supplies to the men, transferred the remainder to a train of pack mules. At noon on the 28th the foot of the Cumberland Mountains was reached on the north side, opposite Crank's Gap, equidistant between Pound Gap and Cumberland Gap. The horses were then fed, a day's forage procured, and the pack mules sent back. A little before sunset the summit of the mountain was reached and in the distance the whole field of their operations was spread out to view. Four hours were occupied in the steep, narrow descent, where General Carter learned that 400 confederate cavalry were encamped at Jonesville, five miles distant. The territory into which Carter had penetrated was comprised in the district entrusted to the guardianship of Humphrey Marshall, whose Falstaffian proportions required that he should remain near headquarters at Abingdon. On the night of the 29th he received from Captain Lanier, stationed at Pattonsville, information by telegraph that 4,000 Union cavalry were marching on Bristol, forty-five miles distant.

Marshall's force consisted of the Forty-sixth Virginia infantry, newly formed, encamped near Bristol, a battalion of Kentuckians under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ezekial F. Clay, a battalion of artillery, 500 strong, at Jefferson, Tazewell county, with twelve guns, and a battery of six pieces at Wytheville. He had in addition to this a mounted force scattered through the country whose principal employment was to forage for subsistence for themselves and horses. The obese general seemed to be always a man with a grievance. Kirby Smith had banished his cavalry from his domain and forbidden them to collect forage in East Tennessee. General Floyd, in the enjoyment of vice regal rights under State authority in Western Virginia, although not his superior officer, treated him with cold contempt. A nomadic life had bred within his capacious breast a restless desire to accomplish something, but as fast as he succeeded in accumulating a force sufficient to carry out a grand design it was taken from him. The constant victim of nostalgia he was compelled to stand without the gates of that paradise which all true-born Kentuckians are taught to believe centres in the Blue Grass region, and feed his hungry recruits upon the husks beyond Pound Gap. Colonel Giltner's Fourth Kentucky cavalry had moved on from day to day, in compliance with Kirby Smith's demand, to Russell county, Virginia; Clay's battalion of Kentucky mounted rifles was near the Three Springs, in Washington county. Johnson's battalion still lingered near Kingsport, always on the eve of starting for Kentucky in search of forage and recruits. Witcher's battalion of Virginia riflemen had drifted as far east as Chatham Hill, above the Salt Works. McFarland's company were grazing in the rich lands of Tazewell county. Thus at the instant when Captain Lanier's telegram was handed to General Marshall his force of 3,000 men was scattered over sixty miles of territory, all intent upon the one object—of filling their stomachs and those of their horses. Colonel Sharp, commanding the regiment at Bristol, was ordered by telegram to keep a sharp lookout in the direction of Pattonville. Batteries of artillery were ordered from Wytheville to Bristol. Judging that the real point of attack was the Salt Works, where irreparable injury could be inflicted in a few hours' time, the Georgia battery was ordered to that place, where, in front of Hyde's Gap, covering Saltville, a regiment of cavalry was encamped. Lieutenant-Colonel Pryor, of the Fourth Kentucky cavalry, visiting at Abingdon, was aroused and sent to his camp, 22 miles, with orders to throw out heavy pickets toward Russell, Hensonville, and the mouth of Dump's Creek, with videttes thrown out towards Estillville and Osborne's Ford, on Clinch River. Major Tom Johnson, visiting at Abingdon, was sent to his camp at Kingsport with orders to join Clay at Three Springs. Captain Harmon, in command of Witcher's battalion, was ordered to move rapidly down Poor Valley to the Little Moccasin Gap, throw out scouts to Hanson's and open communication with Giltner. Toward morning a railroad train arrived from Bristol, and the conductor was directed to remain and transport troops back to that point, but disobeyed the order, thus preventing the arrival of troops at that point until too late to be of any avail.

While Marshall was making these dispositions of the forces at his command, General Carter was advancing rapidly toward the railroad. All through the day and night of the 29th the column marched down Cove Creek through a gap in Poor Valley Ridge across Powell's Valley, reaching the top of Waller's Ridge at daylight of the 30th. Thence through Stickneyville across Powell's Mountain through Pattersonville and across Clinch River, arriving at Estillville at 10 p. m. Here they met Witcher's battalion, which fled towards Kingsport without firing a gun. No time now for rest. Confederate cavalry hovering upon their flanks, on they moved, in compact ranks, through the mud and darkness, over unknown roads, picking up the enemy's stragglers at every mile of the march. A sergeant of the Second Michigan cavalry, with two soldiers, falling to the rear to adjust a saddle girth, rode on to join the command and missed the way in the darkness of the night. Seeing cavalry ahead, they rode up and asked if the column had passed. "What column," was asked. "Carter's," was the response. "We are confederates, and you are prisoners." The poor fellows surrendered, and immediately afterwards a pistol shot laid one of them dead at the feet of their captors. The murder was committed by Major Johnson, commanding a battalion of Kentucky mounted rifles, who was on his way from Abingdon to join his command. Immediately preceding the capture he had come up with Lieutenant Duncan's company "A," of Lieutenant-Colonel Clay's command, scouting from his camp toward Estillville. "The two remaining prisoners," says Clay in his report, "were sent to camp accompanied by Major Johnson, who was very much excited and yet holding his pistol in his hand."

At daylight, on the morning of the 30th, Carter reached Blountville, where he captured and paroled some thirty soldiers of the Fourth Kentucky cavalry. Bristol was eight miles ahead, but hearing that it was guarded by a regiment nine hundred strong and a battery of artillery, Carter moved to the right to strike the railroad toward Union. Meanwhile the country lying to the left of his line of march was alive with troops hastening to the defense of Bristol and Saltville.

The Second Michigan cavalry was dispatched to Union to take the place and destroy the railroad bridge, while Carter remained a few hours to await the arrival of the rear-guard in charge of stragglers. Major McDowell, in command of a battalion of the Sixty-second North Carolina, surrendered without resistance, and on the arrival of Carter with the main body the bridge across the Holston, a fine structure 600 feet in length, was slowly burning. The prisoners were paroled, and that afternoon were on their way to the mountains of North Carolina, swearing they would never be exchanged. Their joy at being captured seemed to be unbounded. The depot, containing a large quantity of salt, nitre, and other government stores, was burned. As soon as the work of destruction was fairly under way Colonel Walker, with Colonel J. P. Carter, of the Second East Tennesse infantry, who accompanied the expedition as guide, with detachments of the Second Michigan, Ninth Pennsylvania, and Seventh Ohio cavalry, in all 181 men, started for the Watauga bridge at Carter Station, ten miles west of Union. On their way they captured a locomotive and tender, on which Colonel Love, of the Sixty-second North Carolina, was hastening to Union to investigate the truth of the rumor that a Union force was advancing upon Bristol. Two companies of his regiment were posted at Carter's Station, where Colonel Walker arrived about sunset and attacked at once. After a brief resistance the guard, 200 strong, broke and fled to the woods. Major Roper, of the Sixth Kentucky cavalry, with two companies of the Ninth Pennsylvania, under Captain Jones, in a gallant dash in pursuit, captured and destroyed many of the fugitives. Walker lost two killed and three wounded; the confederates lost twelve to sixteen killed and a proportionate number wounded. The railroad bridge, 300 feet in length, was soon in flames and completely demolished; also a large number of arms and valuable stores, including the locomotive, which was run into the river.

While the Union cavalry was engaged in destroying the railroad, General Marshall having, as he supposed, obtained accurate information of its number and movements, made such disposition of his forces as to attempt its capture. The alarm had been given; the road was open to Knoxville from Carter's Station and from Union to Abingdon. At half-past seven on the morning of the 30th Lieutenant-Colonel Clay telegraphed Marshall the capture of three prisoners, and reported a force of 1,500 or 2,000 strong advancing toward Bristol. Clay determined to hold his position in front of Slemp's regiment, which was Bristol, 400 strong, until reinforcements could be sent to that point. Between Clay's camp and Bristol two roads converged, by each of which he was informed the Union cavalry was advancing. He therefore sent scouts down both of these roads in the direction of Blountsville and Estillville. At 11 a. m. videttes on the former road brought information that the Union cavalry had left the Bristol road and advanced on Union Station. This information was also telegraphed to Marshall at Abingdon, and Clay fell back upon Bristol in the expectation that Carter would move east upon that place. All this time Marshall had been in telegraphic communication with the railroad officials first at Bristol and then at Lynchburg, asking for cars to transport his troops from Abingdon to Bristol, only fifteen miles. After at last reaching the proper officer a train reached Abingdon.

After the burning of the bridges at 8 p. m. of the 30th, information came from Slemp that his command and Clay's, 900 strong, were concentrated at Bristol, but afraid to attack Carter, whose force they estimated at 2,000. Colonel Giltner was directed at 6 p. m. to move his cavalry to Bristol and unite with Clay and Slemp. The same order was sent to Witcher at Little Moccasin Gap. Marshall arrived at Bristol with reinforcements at midnight; no one knew where Carter had gone from Watauga. Fearing an attack upon Johnson's camp, he ordered him to join Clay; then went to bed. The train came in during the night, bringing ten cannon but no horses to move them. These he had ordered from Wytheville, the horses to travel on foot. While the confederate commander was wooing the drowsy god Carter had turned the head of his column westward. Leaving Watauga at midnight he reached Kingsport at sunset on the 31st. A brief rest, a supper to men and horses, and the men were again in the saddle,—past Rogersville, which they left eight miles to the south, through Looney's Gap of Clinch Mountain, bivouacking for the first time in ninety-six hours late at night at a point in Hancock county, Tennessee. The morning of the 31st found General Marshall engaged upon a map of the country constructed under the supervision of several citizens of Jonesboro. At 12 m. he received information that the Union cavalry was still in camp near Union; then that they were en route for Kingsport; later that they were in camp at Hull's, four miles south of Blountville, on the Jonesboro road, with an earnest request to send all his force to Kingsport. Still later Captain Baldwin telegraphed that the Union cavalry, about 2,000 strong, were making their way to Rogersville with a view to plundering the bank at that place. This dispatch was dated 8 p. m., and still the plethoric commander lingered at Bristol. Captain Bedford, of Clay's command, who had left Bristol about noon, passing through Blountville, and hearing nothing of a camp at Hull's, sent back word to that effect, whereupon Giltner was dispatched with all speed to Blountville, there to co-operate with Baldwin and cut Carter off from Moccasin Gap. Marshall had been promised reinforcements by General Sam Jones, commanding at Dublin, Va., but they had not arrived. His artillery horses were still on the road. The conflicting statements of his scouts obscured the movements of Carter's cavalry, and to add to his perplexity the map provided for him by Mr. Dunn was made without regard to points of compass or distance from place to place. When finally he was warned by the flight of time that a movement must be made in pursuit, he found that he had but 1,533 effectives with which to capture a force estimated at double that number. Nevertheless Marshall moved from Bristol on the night of the 31st and occupied Moccasin Gap about four a. m. on the morning of the 1st of January. Supposing that Carter would cross the Clinch range below Estillville he sent messengers to arouse the bushwhackers in Lee county, Virginia, through which Carter would be likely to pass, and others to Cumberland Gap and Pound Gap, requesting co-operation while he moved forward to Spier's Ferry, which Carter had crossed in his outward march. Up to midnight of January 1st no information could be obtained of Carter's movements. In obedience to his orders the countrymen had felled trees across the roads, but in some cases had taken the precaution to wait until the Union column had passed, when, finding his way blockaded, Marshall remained at Pridemores, five miles beyond Spier's Ferry, until the morning of January 2d, when he moved to Pattonsville, and Carter resumed his march in the direction of Jonesville, where 400 infantry and two companies of cavalry from Cumberland Gap had taken position. Carter reached Jonesville late in the afternoon. The infantry fell back but the cavalry showed fight. A charge led by Colonel Walker drove them in haste to the wood with a loss of several killed and wounded. Twenty were captured and paroled. At eleven p. m. the column passed through Crank's Gap, and thoroughly exhausted from a march of five days and a half, in which they had been out of the saddle but seventeen hours, threw themselves upon the ground and rested until morning. Marshall advanced from Pattonsville toward Jonesville, reaching there in time to hurry Carter's rear guard out of the town, but, deterred from pursuit by the impression that Carter's force was superior to his own, and that his troops might be led into an ambuscade, he followed Carter's example and went into camp. The expedition returned to Manchester, Kentucky, on the 5th, when the force was disbanded and the detachments sent to their respective commands.

This raid of over 470 miles, 170 of which was through the enemy's country, bears favorable comparison with any made by either [illegible] or Forrest during the year, and demonstrated the equal endurance of the northern cavalry. Had the force been at all commensurate with the undertaking, General Carter could have turned eastward from Watauga bridge and swept the railroad as far as Abingdon. The destruction of the saltworks at Saltville would have inflicted irreparable damage upon the confederacy, and the defeat of the broken and disorganized force of Humphrey Marshall would have given a favorable opportunity for the Union men of East Tennessee to assert their rights by revolt.

Their probation, however, soon ended. For nearly two years the Unionists of East Tennessee had looked forward to the time of their deliverance from confederate bondage. The flag of their country had floated on several occasions from the peaks of the Cumberland Mountains, but had as often disappeared behind the western slope. Like a mirage, it had excited their hopes only to dash them to the ground. The expedition led by their countryman, General Carter, proved the avant courier of a powerful army under General Burnside, which a few months later planted the Stars and Stripes upon the pinacles in Knoxville, where it floated in triumph until the close of the war.

A CONFEDERATE SOLDIER'S OPINION

The evacuation of Richmond was a sad blow to the tens of thousands whose blind faith in Lee had led them to believe that his army could suffer everything and still stand between Grant and the capital. But when he left the trenches of Petersburg not one man in a thousand in his army knew that the end was near. Indeed, they looked upon it as a move toward some new victory. Cavalry and artillery horses were mere skeletons, the army in rags and confederate money no better than brown paper, and yet when did those men fight better than in those last dark days? On the morning of the final surrender only a few men saw the shadow of the falling hammer which was to strike a last blow. Brigades which did not number 500 men, regiments which did not number 100, companies in which there were only six or seven private soldiers, girded themselves for another battle. The last skirmish line ever thrown out in front of Lee's army was commanded by a captain now attached to the Virginia state government. With thirty men he pushed forward through the woods until stopped by three Federal lines of battle. The skirmishers halted in amazement. Look which way they would there were the lines of blue. Not a shot was fired. Instead of the crash of musketry there came the words: "No use, Johnny—Lee is going to surrender!"

It was the last day and the last hour. The principle of secession had been drowned in blood—rebellion had been wiped out. After that should have come peace and good-will. A hate born of war and enduring through years of peace is unworthy even of a savage. The confederacy was a bubble in which but few believed with all their heart. If secession meant separation from the North it meant separation from each other afterwards. It would be hard to find a score of intelligent men in the South to-day who have any arguments against a grand and glorious Union which shall be represented by a single flag.

The Senate Committee which investigated the Treasury contingent fund expenditures, has made a report reciting the various petty frauds which were perpetrated by subordinates in the property department of the Treasury, and condemning the loose system under which the vouchers were passed.

GARFIELD---ROSECRANS.

EXTRAORDINARY INTEREST AROUSED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

What General Rosecrans Says About the Stanton-Morton Interview—The Chase Letter Read in Cabinet Meeting—Governor Young, General Sturgis, Colonel Temple Clarke and Col. Hunter Brooke Express their Views Freely—Opinions of the Press.

The publication of General Rosecrans's paper on the Tullahoma Campaign in the last issue of THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE has attracted wide-spread attention which has not alone been limited to military circles. THE TRIBUNE'S article was reproduced in the columns of many of our exchanges, including the New York *Herald*, Philadelphia *Press* and *Times*, Louisville *Commercial*, Boston *Herald*, Chicago *Times*, and Baltimore *Sun*, *Gazette*, and *American*, and the subject has been discussed editorially in these and many other leading journals. There have also been numerous contributions on the subject involved in the controversy, some of which we reproduce below, together with opinions of the press. We have avoided the most offensive, on either side, and have endeavored, by selecting such as are comparatively calm and temperate, to gauge the depth of public feeling on the subject.

VIEWS OF GENERAL JAMES BARNETT.

A correspondent of the New York *Herald* at Cleveland, Ohio, called upon General James Barnett, who was colonel of artillery in the Army of the Cumberland, and who, from November 24, 1862, was chief of artillery on Rosecrans' staff. He said in substance: "I regret exceedingly this unfortunate affair and do not wish to be drawn into the controversy. Of all men, living or dead, Garfield and Rosecrans were two of my best and most intimate friends. I was a member of Rosecrans' military family during the time Garfield was chief of staff, enjoyed the confidence of both and knew their plans and sentiments. The idea that Garfield was untrue to his commander, two-faced in his dealings, or sought to supersede him is all bosh and unjust. He was not that kind of a man; he was impatient at the delay and anxious for the army to move and so expressed himself. The feeling was general among the men and with many of the officers, though it was not shared in by Rosecrans and the division commanders generally. Garfield's views were well understood and freely expressed, yet he was true to Rosecrans, and carried out his plans to the letter. He always, while in the army and after the war, spoke in the highest terms of 'Rosey,' as he was in the habit of calling him, defended him when attacked and extolled his ability as a military man and his character as a gentleman. This talk about his working a scheme to get Rosecrans removed or to supersede him is absurd. Even if Rosecrans had been removed there was no probability of Garfield being placed in command, with General Thomas and others in the line of promotion, and I do not think such an idea ever entered Garfield's head. During the Presidential campaign Garfield stepped into my office one day, and in the course of conversation said: 'What do you suppose is the matter with Rosey? Do you see how he is attacking me?' He appeared very much grieved over it and said he could not understand it. He at that time reiterated his high opinion of the General, and said he would not believe the report until it was confirmed. Garfield's letter to Chase, as published, is undoubtedly genuine, but there is nothing in it reflecting upon General Rosecrans or that should cause all this commotion. The letter was not official, but a strictly private and confidential expression of his views and feelings to a dear friend. In his interviews with President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton, after the battle of Chickamauga, he simply gave a history of the movements and the battle from his standpoint, and defended Rosecrans to both, as his many friends were given to understand at the time from his conversation. Garfield was never untrue or unfaithful to Rosecrans. If he had been I would have been likely to know it. He was not capable of the double dealing which some of his enemies have charged, and this attempt to array the living Rosecrans against the dead Garfield and to blight the sacred memory of the dead is unwarranted. There is nothing in it."

WHAT GENERAL NEGLEY HAS TO SAY.

General James S. Negley, one of the best known division commanders during the war, one of Garfield's intimate friends, and one who went through the Tullahoma campaign, was interviewed on the Garfield-Rosecrans matter at Pittsburg, Pa. He said: "While a member of Congress in Washington I learned through a military friend that letters of criticism upon the Tullahoma campaign had been written by General Garfield, and that a knowledge of this fact had provoked whatever feeling was understood to have existed between Generals Garfield and Rosecrans, although I never conversed with either of them upon the subject. Later on I learned authoritatively that General Garfield claimed the credit of differing with General Rosecrans and his other generals in regard to the movements at Murfreesboro, hence I was not surprised to learn that General Rosecrans had taken offense at what he deemed to be the treachery of his late chief of staff, and I am not surprised now to find that General Rosecrans entertains a deep sensitiveness upon this subject, for if there ever were two officers in the army who were as intimate as father and son it was to be found in the military relations existing between Generals Rosecrans and Garfield. I regret exceedingly that a letter written in the enthusiasm of youth, more from a political standpoint than from the inspiration of military judgment or experience, has been made the occasion of misinterpreting the true motives of General Garfield and the cause for doubting the military ability and efficiency of General Rosecrans in that campaign. If the terms of this letter are to be construed into a grave reflection upon the military reputation of General Rosecrans they might with equal propriety be so considered in connection with the reputation of every one of the seventeen generals referred to in General Garfield's letters.

"Now, to my understanding, the following are about the facts in the case: General Rosecrans achieved a brilliant success at Stone River, but the victory was attained at a heavy cost, not only in the loss of men but in the destruction of the equipments and munitions of war. Murfreesboro was a strategic position, not only for the Union army, but also for the confederate commander. It formed the basis of operations against a wide sweep of the lines of the Southern Confederacy. To maintain and hold permanently the position commanded the immediate attention of General Rosecrans after the battle of Stone River He therefore caused elaborate fortifications of the strongest type to be constructed at that point, and busied himself in gathering supplies and in reorganizing his army. This work was necessarily slow, in consequence of the long exposed lines of his communication, bad roads, and the deficiency of forage in the surrounding country. While it is true that the aggregate of his army might be larger than the force under General Bragg, the latter occupied an intrenched position naturally favorable for the purpose of defense or attack, and near enough to the Federal lines to harass them continually by the aid of his large force of regular and irregular cavalry. General Rosecrans was compelled to maintain outlying posts and lines to protect both the river communication and his lines of railroad. It will therefore be readily understood that an advance movement from Murfreesboro could only be made with any hope of success by withdrawing a portion of the outlying garrisons under the command of General Rosecrans. When the advance was made I do not believe the army had more than five days' supply of forage in store, and I am certain it was not fully equipped two weeks previous. The confidential letter addressed by General Rosecrans to his corps commanders and brigade generals was not received by them until the 9th of June. Of course no one of those generals, excepting General Garfield, was in a position to know the contents of the correspondence which had taken place between Generals Halleck and Rosecrans; and indeed, so far as I was concerned, I did not learn of the fact until informed by Mr. Stanton some months subsequently. While the discussion had assumed a spirit of asperity between the War Department and the commanding general, the fact had made no impression on the judgment of the other general officers with the exception of General Garfield. Hence his desire to constrain his views in accord with those entertained in Washington.

"This is the more apparent when we find that he addressed his letter to Mr. Chase on the 27th of July, immediately after the termination of the Tullahoma campaign, a campaign ably commenced and executed with remarkable completeness, a campaign wherein General Rosecrans fully sustained his reputation for military genius, forethought and boldness. The enemy was driven from his chosen position and hastily retired beyond the Tennessee River without being able to derive any benefit from the stronghold he had established at Tullahoma, and the extensive preparations he had made to receive the army of General Rosecrans and win a long-looked-for victory for the confederacy. General Garfield did not state in his letter to Mr. Chase what opinion he passed upon the other interrogations contained in the confidential letter, but seems to have confined his expression of judgment on the single inquiry as to whether the army should immediately move forward. I do not doubt if that single inquiry had been propounded by General Rosecrans to his officers that the answer of the majority would have been in the affirmative, but when taken with an estimate of the contingencies which could arise through a forward movement each answer was doubtless given with a studied hesitancy and extreme caution.

"I sum up the whole case to be about as follows: General Garfield wrote freely to his friend, giving utterance to his hopes and political views without the slightest intention of doing an injustice to his superior, and it was only in after years that this untimely and unfortunate letter became the source of unexpected interest, and to-day it attains its chief proportions in the ill-advised attempt to glorify the already illustrious memory of President Garfield at the expense of the feelings and honor of his living comrades. That he would condemn it if living I am positively certain. That every true friend of his condemns the act I am certain; and every lover of justice and truth should hesitate to deprive General Rosecrans of the credit he deserves for the achievements of the army under his command at Stone River and at Tullahoma. General Garfield was at that period of his life more of a politician than he was a general, by lack of experience. He had lately left the Ohio senate, where he had taken a very active and aggressive part in the political issue grown out of the war, and it was quite natural that he should sympathize with this side of the question. He had grown to be familiar with the cry. 'On to Richmond!' and deemed it a necessary requirement on the part of the general officers to satisfy the public impatience at home. I

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